FRCrP 6(e) and the Disclosure of
Documents Reviewed by a Grand Jury
Andrea M. Nervit
Consider the following scenario: Company D imports electronic components from Asia. Company P distributes components
to end-use manufacturers. Companies P and D enter into a joint
venture where orders placed with P will be filled by D, and the net
proceeds upon resale split equally. Company D, however, falsely
inflates its import costs, thereby cheating P out of a portion of the
profits. A federal grand jury is convened, subpoenas all of Company D's financial records, and returns an indictment charging D
with mail fraud, wire fraud, and criminal RICO.
Meanwhile Company P files suit against Company D, pursuant
to civil RICO provisions, seeking treble damages. Central to P's
case are documents chronicling D's component purchasing, including actual invoices and accounting entries. P serves D with a request for production of those documents. D responds that it no
longer has the documents: they have been subpoenaed by the
grand jury. Company P then contacts the United States Attorney
supervising the investigation-or, perhaps, the court directly-requesting access to the documents. Will Company P's request be granted?
A starting point for analysis is Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(2), which provides:
A grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a
recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony,
an attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made ...shall not disclose matters occurring before
the grand jury, except as otherwise provided for in these rules.
No obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule ....

The Company P/Company D example illustrates a persistent
and troubling question of interpretation under Rule 6(e): Are documents "matters occurring before the grand jury" to which the
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rule's secrecy requirements apply? Or are documents outside the
complex framework regulating disclosure under Rule 6(e), and thus
discoverable like any other non-privileged item? This issue is fundamentally a conflict between the traditional policies underlying
grand jury secrecy-such as protecting grand jurors, ensuring the
f'ull cooperation of witnesses, and preventing civil litigants from
exploiting the grand jury's extensive investigative powers-and the
liberal discovery policies embodied in the modern Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.
Unlike, for example, transcripts of grand jury testimony,
which always implicate Rule 6(e) by revealing the entire substance
of the investigation, documents are only potential sources of disclosure. To continue the above example, assume that Company P's
request for production of documents-directed initially at Company D but subsequently at the U.S. Attorney and the district
court-sought "Company D's invoices of semiconductor purchases
between January 1986 and November 1987." Disclosure of the documents would reveal no information about the grand jury's line of
questioning, its reason for reviewing the items and the conclusions
it drew, or Company D's explanation of the documents. The only
potential revelation occurred prior to disclosure, when D told P of
the grand jury subpoena: Company P knows that the grand jury
reviewed those documents. Absent any knowledge of the value the
grand jury attributed to the documents, however, this information
seems to add nothing.
In contrast, suppose that Company P, upon learning from D of
the investigation, had requested "all documents subpoenaed by the
federal grand jury investigating Company D." Here, Company P is
clearly engaged in a fishing expedition designed to benefit from the
existence of a grand jury with coercive powers. Compliance with
such a request might yield documents that Company P did not
know existed, and that it might have been unable to obtain under
normal civil discovery rules. The release of documents requested in
this general way seems to threaten grand jury secrecy far more
than in the case in which specific documents were requested. Ideally, one would want to design a test that could distinguish between such polar examples.
Recognizing, often implicitly, a need to balance the competing
considerations of grand jury secrecy and liberal discovery, courts
have developed a variety of tests for determining whether particular documents are in fact within the scope of Rule 6(e). Some
courts have adopted blanket rules: documents always are consid-

1990]

Grand Jury Documents

ered "matters occurring before the grand jury," or never are.1
These "per se" rules, while offering a bright line test that requires
minimal judicial resources, fail to adequately address the secrecy
and discovery considerations, making errors in disclosure or suppression more likely. Other courts have developed highly factbased inquiries, in which the effects of or motives for disclosure are
examined by the district judge evaluating the document request.2
While these tests recognize that documents implicate secrecy and
discovery considerations to varying degrees, they consume significant judicial resources and provide little guidance to future courts
and litigants.
While this Comment strongly supports accommodation of the
secrecy and discovery concerns implicated by requests for grand
jury documents, it concludes that any test for determining whether
documents are "matters occurring before the grand jury" must accord primary deference to secrecy considerations. One court has
recently suggested weighing these concerns in a test under which
documents are presumed to fall within the scope of Rule 6(e) unless the party seeking disclosure can adequately rebut the presumption.' This Comment proposes a variant on such a presumptive approach. It suggests that the rebuttal factors be tailored to
reflect the principal situations where disclosure would pose minimal or no dangers to grand jury secrecy: (1) when the plaintiff
makes a request for specific documents, framed without reference
to the grand jury; and (2) when the documents sought were created
for an independent purpose unrelated to the grand jury.4 In addition to facilitating discovery in those instances where grand jury
secrecy is least likely to be compromised, this test reduces the administrative burdens and uncertainty of fact-based inquiries as
well as the error costs of blanket rules.
Section I begins by examining the structure and operation of
Rule 6(e) and then turns to a consideration of the conflicting goals
that animate the document disclosure question: grand jury secrecy
and liberal discovery. Section II presents and critiques the various
judicial methods for classifying documents under Rule 6(e). Finally, section III proposes an alternative test for classifying documents, and illustrates its operation by applying it to several cases.

1

See text at notes 64-71.
See text at notes 46-63.

'

See text at notes 76-78.
See text at notes 78-94.

4
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STRUCTURE AND POLICIES

The Operation of Rule 6(e)

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(2) establishes the
general rule of grand jury secrecy. It prohibits disclosure of "matters occurring before the grand jury, except as otherwise provided
for in the[] rules." In order to outline the context of the document
dispute, this subsection surveys the Rule 6(e) framework. First, to
whom does the rule apply? Second, what is a "matter[] occurring
before the grand jury," and what support is there, either in the
text of the rule or the legislative history, for calling a document a
"matter"? And finally, what are the consequences of classifying an
item as a "matter"-may it nonetheless be disclosed under one of
the exceptions to the general rule of secrecy listed in Rule 6(e)(3)?
1.

Persons subject to the obligation of secrecy.

Rule 6(e)(2) lists those individuals subject to its general rule of
secrecy: grand jurors, interpreters, stenographers or operators of
recording devices, typists who transcribe recorded testimony, attorneys for the government, and government personnel who assist
government attorneys in the enforcement of federal criminal law.5
The rule further states that "[n]o obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule." Noticeably absent from this list are witnesses-those individuals who
provide testimony or materials to the grand jury.' A witness may
be the target of the grand jury investigation (a person against
whom an indictment is sought), a subject of the investigation (a
person who may have criminal exposure from the matters under
investigation), or an ordinary witness (a person with information
but no criminal involvement).' Documents are usually sought in
subsequent civil litigation only from targets or subjects, those parties most likely to have committed a wrongful act.
An interesting consequence of Rule 6(e)'s exclusion of witnesses arises in the document disclosure context. Consider the
Company P/Company D example presented earlier. In that case,
Company P originally requested the documents from Company D,
by definition a "witness," since it had provided materials to the
See FRCrP 6(e)(2) (general rule); 6(e)(3)(A)(ii) (government personnel).
See Sara Sun Beale and William C. Bryson, 2 Grand Jury Law and Practice§ 7.05 at
19-26 (Callaghan, 1986) for further discussion of the witness exclusion.
' Candace Fabri and Rebecca Cochran, Criminal Discovery for the Civil Litigator, 15
Litig 13, 14 (Fall 1988).
0
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grand jury. Nothing in Rule 6(e)(2) would appear to prevent Company D from disclosing copies of the documents (had it made any)
to Company P through ordinary civil discovery methods. There
are, however, several possible reasons why this situation rarely
arises.' First, Company D, for strategic reasons, may not retain
copies of the documents if they can be discovered under the relatively lenient standards of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.9
Second, even if Company D retains copies, it may assert a Rule
6(e)(2) "privilege" against disclosure; the reviewing court may respect the asserted privilege in order to advance the policies of Rule
6(e) and prevent strategic behavior on an issue like photocopying.
In any case, the prosecutor or the court are usually the parties
to whom civil plaintiffs ultimately address their document disclosure requests. 10 Government attorneys and assisting personnel are
clearly subject to Rule 6(e)(2)'s obligation of secrecy. And the
court may certainly order disclosure, but only upon determining
that (1) the requested item is not a "matter" under Rule 6(e)(2); or
(2) even if it is a "matter," some exception to Rule 6(e)(2) permits
1
disclosure. The next sections address these issues.
2.

The scope of "matters occurring before the grand jury."

Once it is established that Rule 6(e)(2)'s obligation of secrecy
applies, the next step in deciding whether an item may be disclosed is determining whether the item sought is a "matter[] occurring before the grand jury." This is the heart of the Rule 6(e)(2)
inquiry: if the item is not a "matter," then the rule does not apply;
but if the item is a "matter," the rule prohibits disclosure unless
one of the exceptions listed in Rule 6(e)(3) applies."
8 No case or article reviewed in this Comment addressed this issue.
9 FRCP 34 compels production of documents, described by the discovering party "with
reasonable particularity," that constitute "matters within the scope of Rule 26(b) and which
are in the possession, custody or control of the party upon whom the request is served
FRCP .....
26(b)(1) in turn describes the scope of discovery as "any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action ...." Relevance is construed "broadly and liberally" for discovery purposes. James W. Moore, Jo
Desha Lucas, and George J. Grotheer, Jr., 4 Moore's Federal Practice 26.56[1] at 94 (Matthew Bender, 2d ed 1989) ("Moore's").
10 See, for example, In re Grand Jury Investigation (New Jersey State Commission of
Investigation), 630 F2d 996 (3d Cir 1980) (commission initially subpoenaed documents from
companies, but upon learning of grand jury investigation, asked court); United States v
Interstate Dress Carriers,280 F2d 52 (2d Cir 1960) (agency initially asked defendant, who
no longer had the records, so Justice Department, which had the records, applied to the
court for leave to allow the agency access to the records); and In the Matter of Special
March 1981 Grand Jury (Almond Pharmacy), 753 F2d 575 (7th Cir 1985) (agency first
asked defendant, who had not made copies, and then prosecutor filed motion with court
asking for disclosure).
11See text at notes 26-28 for a discussion of the Rule 6(e)(3) exceptions.
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Certain classes of materials, such as transcripts of grand jury
proceedings and the names of witnesses testifying before the grand
jury, are clearly "matters occurring before the grand jury."1 2 But
once we move beyond these areas of universal agreement, the
phrase "matters occurring before the grand jury" poses problems.
On the one hand, it can be read broadly by focusing on the word
"matters," which suggests the drafters were concerned about a
whole range of potentially revealing items, not just transcripts or
the identity of witnesses. Alternatively, it can be read narrowly by
focusing on the verb "occurring," which suggests events
that-unlike documents-actually take place before the grand
3
jury.1
The legislative history of Rule 6(e) does not indicate whether
Congress intended to include documents within the scope of the
rule when it adopted the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in
1946.14 The Advisory Committee's notes accompanying Rule 6(e)
similarly offer little guidance. The notes explain in general terms
that the rule "continues the traditional practice of secrecy on the
part of members of the grand jury, except when the court permits
a disclosure."' 5 None of the cases cited as examples addresses the
question of whether documents are protected by the "traditional
practice."' 6
Several years ago an amendment to Rule 6(e) was proposed
that would have eliminated the confusion surrounding the appropriate treatment of documents. The Advisory Committee circulated a proposal that would have expressly included "the nature
12 See Beale and Bryson, 2 Grand Jury Law §7.06 at 26 (cited in note 6) (testimony
and witness identity); William B. Lytton, Grand Jury Secrecy-Time for a Reevaluation,
75 J Crim L & Criminol 1100, 1105 (1984) (transcripts); Fund for Constitutional Government v National Archives, 656 F2d 856, 869 (DC Cir 1981) (witness names); and In the
Matter of Disclosure of Testimony Before the Grand Jury (Troia), 580 F2d 281 (8th Cir
1978) (lists of witnesses and portions of testimony).
13 See Comment, Civil Discovery of Documents Held by a Grand Jury, 47 U Chi L Rev
604, 607 (1980).
14 Id at 608 n 20, discussing early drafts of the rule. See generally Lester B. Orfield, The
Federal Grand Jury, 22 FRD 343, 346-57 (1959).
15 FRCrP 6(e), Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules.
16 See Schmidt v United States, 115 F2d 394 (6th Cir 1940) (private interview of grand
jury members who had participated in indictment of attorney's client violated jurors' oath);
United States v American Medical Ass'n., 26 F Supp 429 (D DC 1939) (grand juror's oath
of secrecy is permanent, and may be broken only upon court order). Note, however, that the
oath administered in Schmidt did commit the jurors to keep secret both testimony and
documents.
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and contents of any books, papers, documents or other objects subpoenaed or otherwise obtained for use by the grand jury" within
Rule 6(e)(2)'s secrecy provisions." Citing considerable confusion
among courts regarding the proper treatment of documents under
Rule 6(e), the Committee advanced the amendment "to emphasize
that the secrecy provisions of the rule apply both to the testimony
of subpoenaed witnesses and the nature and content of effects subpoenaed or otherwise obtained for use by the grand jury."' 18 The
Advisory Committee, however, eventually withdrew the amendment as "unnecessary."' 9
The withdrawal of the amendment is as ambiguous as the current text of the rule. Was Rule 6(e)'s coverage considered sufficiently broad to encompass documents without requiring a formal
change in the rule, or did the Committee decide that expanding
the rule to include documents would be unwise? It is also possible
that the Advisory Committee decided not to inhibit further judicial development of solutions to document disclosure. Such hesitancy to impose statutory solutions has clearly
underlain Commit2
tee restraint in other aspects of Rule 6(e). "
Given the textual and historical ambiguity of the phrase "matters occurring before the grand jury," it is not surprising that judicial characterization of documents has been inconsistent and confusing. The breadth of the category may contribute to the problem:
"documents" can range from ordinary corporate financial records
to evidence collected in a homicide investigation.2 '
17 See Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the
United States, PreliminaryDraft of Proposed Amendments to Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure 1-3 (October 1981) ("PreliminaryDraft"); see also Charles Alan Wright, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 106 at 249 n 23 (West, 1982) ("Wright").
18 Advisory Committee Note to Rule 6(e)(2), PreliminaryDraft at 6 (cited in note 17).
1" Communication from the Chief Justice of the United States, Amendments to the
Rules of Criminal Procedure for the U.S. District Courts, HR Doc No 98-55, 98th Cong, 1st
Sess 19 (1983). See also, Amendments to Rules, 97 FRD 245, 260 (1983).
See Advisory Committee Note to Rule 6(e)(3)(C), PreliminaryDraft at 8 (cited in
note 17), explaining the Committee's decision not to codify a long-accepted judicial gloss on
Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i). Rather, the "applicability and meaning of that standard [was] left to
further development in the case law."
21 For cases addressing ordinary corporate financial records, see Almond Pharmacy,753
F2d 575; United States ex rel Woodard v Tynan, 757 F2d 1085 (10th Cir 1985); New Jersey
State Commission of Investigation, 630 F2d 996; In re Sells, 719 F2d 985 (9th Cir 1983);
and Interstate Dress Carriers,280 F2d 52. Other financial or business-related documents
appearing in the cases include: purchase and sale statements for securities trading accounts,
In re Special February, 1975 Grand Jury (Baggot), 662 F2d 1232 (7th Cir 1981), aff'd on
other grounds sub nom United States v Baggot, 463 US 476 (1983); auditors' analyses of a
firm's records, In re Grand Jury Matter (Garden Court), 697 F2d 511 (3d Cir 1982); commercial bank records, invoices, and delivery receipts, United States v Penrod, 609 F2d 1092
21
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Another factor potentially complicating the determination of
Rule 6(e)'s applicability to documents is the manner in which the
documents are received by the grand jury. In most of the reported
cases, the documents have been subpoenaed.2 2 In other cases, documents have been "otherwise obtained," presumably voluntarily
presented to the grand jury. 3 Some courts suggest that the grand
jury's use of its coercive powers necessitates stricter disclosure
standards for subpoenaed documents.2 4 There is an obvious problem with such a distinction, however. Voluntary presentation is unlikely to occur unless the documents are accorded the same protection as subpoenaed materials. Targets or subjects of a grand jury
investigation will fear disclosure to civil plaintiffs, and ordinary
witnesses will fear reproach or reprisal by subjects and targets who
discover the witnesses' cooperation with the grand jury. Thus, all
documents reviewed by a grand jury-whether subpoenaed or voluntarily presented-should be treated equally for the purposes of
characterization under Rule 6(e). 25 The remainder of this Comment will use the term "document" to refer both to subpoenaed
and voluntarily produced materials.

(4th Cir 1979); and all books, documents, and work papers prepared by employees and
outside agents for a company under investigation, In re April 1956 Term Grand Jury, 239
F2d 263 (7th Cir 1956).
Other examples of documents include: evidence collected in a homicide investigation,
Senate of Puerto Rico v U.S. Department of Justice, 823 F2d 574 (DC Cir 1987); a government memorandum recommending sentencing and fines for corporations and officers indicted by a grand jury for antitrust violations, U.S. Industries,Inc. v United States District
Court, 345 F2d 18 (9th Cir 1965); employee lists of federal and local agencies, and welfare
recipient lists, United States v Stanford, 589 F2d 285 (7th Cir 1978); records of the Watergate Special Prosecution Force, Fund for ConstitutionalGovernment, 656 F2d 856; summaries of FBI interviews, Cullen v Margiotta, 811 F2d 698 (2d Cir 1987); travel agency records
of a client, In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Diamante), 814 F2d 61 (Ist Cir 1987); the Selective Service files of certain delinquent registrants, United States v Weinstein, 511 F2d 622
(2d Cir 1975); and tape recordings of individuals indicted, United States v Benjamin, 852
F2d 413 (9th Cir 1988), vacated on other grounds, 109 S Ct 1948 (1989).
" Witnesses provide documents to the grand jury pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum.
Beale and Bryson, 1 Grand Jury Law § 6.09 at 55 (cited in note 6).
2 The number of documents produced voluntarily is probably small. See id at 57-58
(suspects are not likely to voluntarily produce physical evidence if they are aware of its
incriminating nature; disinterested third party witnesses will be reluctant to cooperate informally for fear of incurring suspect's wrath).
2 See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 851 F2d 860, 866 (6th Cir 1988).
21 See PreliminaryDraft at 1 (cited in note 17) (would have amended Rule 6(e)(2) to
include "objects subpoenaed or otherwise obtained for use by the grand jury"). See also
Wright § 106 at 249 n 23 (cited in note 17). The Advisory Committee notes to the proposed
amendment indicate that it was intended to "encourage voluntary disclosure of such objects
to the grand jury." PreliminaryDraft at 10.
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3. The consequences of classifying a document as a "matter[]
occurring before the grand jury."
Once a document is classified as a "matter[] occurring before
the grand jury," Rule 6(e)(2) prohibits disclosure unless one of the
exceptions listed in Rule 6(e)(3) applies. Most of the exceptions
are not relevant to this Comment;2" one, however, is. Rule
6(e)(3)(C)(i) permits disclosure of matters occurring before the
grand jury "when so directed by a court preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding." The Supreme Court has held
that a party seeking disclosure pursuant to Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i) must
demonstrate "particularized need"-namely, (1) that the material
is needed to avoid a possible injustice in another judicial proceeding; (2) that the need for disclosure outweighs the need for continued secrecy; and (3) that the request is structured to cover only the
material needed.
Thus, even when an item has been held to be a matter occurring before the grand jury, possibilities for disclosure still exist.
However, the requesting party must demonstrate a high level of
particularity and need, in contrast to the relatively lenient civil
discovery standards that would govern an item outside the Rule
6(e) framework.2 8
B.

Competing Policies in the Rule 6(e) Document Disclosure

Context
1. The traditional practice of grand jury secrecy.
The tradition of grand jury secrecy can be traced as far back
as seventeenth-century England, and was codified in federal practice in 1946 with the enactment of the Federal Rules of Criminal
2 For example: (1) disclosure to an attorney for the government for use in the performance of such attorney's duty, FRCrP 6(e)(3)(A)(i); (2) disclosure to government personnel
assisting an attorney for the government, FRCrP 6(e)(3)(A)(ii); (3) disclosure upon a showing that grounds may exist to dismiss the indictment against the defendant, FRCrP
6(e)(3)(C)(ii); (4) disclosure to another federal grand jury, FRCrP 6(e)(3)(C)(iii); and (5)
disclosure to an appropriate state official upon a showing that such matters may reveal a
violation of state criminal law, FRCrP 6(e)(3)(C)(iv).
The 1981 proposed amendment to Rule 6(e), discussed above, would also have added an
exception to Rule 6(e)(3) allowing court-directed disclosure of books, papers, documents,
and other objects "upon a showing which would suffice to compel disclosure of the objects if
they had remained in the custody of the person from whom they were subpoenaed or otherwise obtained for use by the grand jury." PreliminaryDraft at 2-3 (cited in note 17).
27 Douglas Oil Co. v Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 US 211, 222 (1979). See also United
States v Sells Engineering,Inc., 463 US 418, 442-44 (1983).
28 See

note 9.
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Procedure.2 9 Judicial pronouncements of the inviolability of that
tradition abound. Courts have proclaimed that "the proper functioning of our grand jury system depends upon the secrecy of
grand jury proceedings,"3 0 and that "[t]he secrecy of the grand
jury is sacrosanct."'" Despite suggestions from some commentators
that the rule of secrecy may have "outlived its usefulness, '32 the
Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the tradition's importance:
Grand jury secrecy ... is as important for the protection of
the innocent as for the pursuit of the guilty. Both Congress
and this Court have consistently stood ready to defend it
against unwarranted intrusion. In the absence of a clear indication in a statute or Rule, we must always be reluctant to
33
conclude that a breach of this secrecy has been authorized.
The policies underlying the general rule of grand jury secrecy
have been frequently cited: (1) to prevent the escape of persons
whose indictment is contemplated; (2) to provide the grand jury
freedom in its deliberations, and to prevent badgering of the grand
jurors by persons subject to indictment; (3) to prevent subornation
of perjury or tampering with the witnesses who may testify before
the grand jury and later appear at the trial of those indicted by it;
(4) to encourage disclosure by persons with relevant information;
and (5) to protect the innocent accused from publication of the
34
fact that he has been under investigation.
In many of the cases where a civil litigant seeks disclosure of
documents, the grand jury has already concluded its investigation.
In this situation, the first three policies behind grand jury secrecy,
which aim to protect the particular grand jury investigation at issue, are inapplicable.3 5 The fifth reason for grand jury secrecy, protecting an innocent accused, is implicated only when the grand
jury fails to return an indictment.3 6 Documentary disclosure often
involves, then, only the fourth, or "institutional" concern: how will
Beale and Bryson, 2 Grand Jury Law §7.02 at 5-7 (cited in note 6).
Douglas Oil, 441 US at 218.
3 United States v Phillips, 843 F2d 438, 441 (11th Cir 1988).
32 Beale and Bryson, Grand Jury Law § 7.02 at 6 (cited in note 6).
31 Sells Engineering, 463 US at 424-25 (citation omitted).
3' United States v Procter & Gamble, 356 US 677, 681-82 n 6 (1958), quoting United
29

States v Rose, 215 F2d 617, 628-29 (3d Cir 1954).
31 See Wright § 106 at 244 (cited in note 17). See also United States v John Doe, Inc. I,
481 US 102, 114 (1987) (termination of grand jury mitigates damage of disclosure). Note,
however, that concern about "witness tampering" will remain after a grand jury investigation if the target is indicted and the witness is scheduled to testify at trial.
"' See Wright § 106 at 244 (cited in note 17).
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disclosure affect the proper functioning of future grand jury proceedings? 37 The Supreme Court has continually emphasized the
importance of this institutional concern, warning that "[flear of future retribution or social stigma may act as powerful deterrents to
those who would come forward and aid the grand jury in the performance of its duties." 8
An additional reason for grand jury secrecy, not part of the
traditional lore, centers on the broad investigative powers of the
grand jury. A grand jury subpoena duces tecum, calling for production of physical evidence, can issue "without any firm basis to believe that evidence will provide proof of the commission of a particular offense." 39 One commentator has stated that "the grand
jury is often permitted fishing expeditions unheard of in civil litigation. ' 40 Given these broad subpoena powers, it seems only reasonable to protect the subject of the investigation from disclosure
of the materials to civil litigants who would otherwise be unable to
obtain them. To the extent that secrecy-or, at least, strict document disclosure standards-minimizes such appropriation of grand
jury work product, the integrity of the criminal justice "system is
furthered.
2.

The need for liberal discovery in civil litigation.

There is a competing-but less compelling-consideration pertinent to the question of document disclosure, and that is the need
for liberal discovery in civil litigation. With the enactment of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a broad brush test of "relevance"
replaced the older practice of limiting discovery to facts supporting
the discovering party's case. 41 The bywords of "broad and liberal"
construction drowned out the "time-honored cry of 'fishing expedition.' ",42 Liberal discovery is favored primarily because it equalizes

37

Id at 244-45.

See Douglas Oil, 441 US at 222 ("[I]n considering the effects of disclosure on grand
jury proceedings, the courts must consider not only the immediate effects upon a particular
grand jury, but also the possible effect upon the functioning of future grand juries."). See
also Sells Engineering,463 US at 432.
39 Beale and Bryson, 1 Grand Jury Law § 6.26 at 176 (cited in 6).
10 Fabri and Cochran, 15 Litig at 15 (cited in note 7).
4 Moore's
26.56[1] at 94 (cited in note 9). See also FRCP 26(b)(1) (discovery may be
had "regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved
in the pending action").
11 See Hickman v Taylor, 329 US 495, 507 (1947) ("[T]he ... discovery rules are to be
accorded a broad and liberal treatment. No longer can the time-honored cry of 'fishing expedition' serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts underlying his opponent's
case.").
38
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parties' access to information.43 An over-inclusive definition of

"matters occurring before the grand jury" may frustrate this equalization principle by prohibiting access to documents except
through the Rule 6(e)(3) provisions. The Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i) "preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding" exception, for example, requires a much greater showing of particularized need than do the ordinary discovery rules."
Yet, despite the importance of liberal discovery to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and modern litigation, concerns about
discovery should not outweigh grand jury secrecy in the document
disclosure context. First, liberal discovery lacks the traditions and
institutional primacy of grand jury secrecy. While the Supreme
Court and many lower courts have affirmed the integral role of
grand jury secrecy in the criminal justice system, few would assert
that restricting discovery of grand jury materials would jeopardize
the civil litigation system.
Furthermore, a determination that a document is a "matter
occurring before the grand jury" does not foreclose disclosure: the
party may still make a showing of particularized need under Rule
6(e)(3)(C)(i) and thereby obtain the document. The existence of
such an escape device minimizes concerns that civil litigants will
be denied access to crucial documents. An improper breach of
grand jury secrecy, on the other hand, threatens the functioning of
future grand juries. Thus, while any test for determining whether
documents are subject to Rule 6(e) should promote liberal discovery, grand jury secrecy concerns must, on balance, prevail.
II.

CURRENT JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO THE CLASSIFICATION OF
DOCUMENTS UNDER

RULE 6(e)

This section explores the six distinctive tests courts have developed for classifying documents as "matters occurring before the
grand jury. '4 5 It evaluates the tests not only on the balance they
strike between secrecy and discovery concerns, but more generally,
on their efficiency, certainty, and accuracy. An optimal approach to
the classification of documents under Rule 6(e) would, with a limited expenditure of judicial resources and discretion, distinguish
among disclosure requests according to the degree they intrude
upon grand jury secrecy.
"' See In re Grand Jury Proceedings,GJ-76-4 & GJ-75-3, 800 F2d 1293, 1302-03 (4th
Cir 1986).
" See text at notes 26-28.
The approaches are analyzed in order of most to least prevalent in the courts.
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The Effect Test

In the sheer number of opinions advocating it, the "effect"
test dominates in the federal courts. Under this approach, the trial
court must determine whether disclosure of the particular item
sought would "reveal the inner workings of the grand
jury"4 S-whether, for example, disclosure would reveal "the identities of witnesses or jurors, the substance of testimony, the strategy
or direction of the investigation, the deliberations or questions of
the jurors, and the like."'47 If such revelations would occur, the doc-

ument is deemed subject to Rule 6(e), and disclosure is permitted
only via the Rule 6(e)(3) exceptions.
The Third, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and District of Columbia
Courts of Appeal have embraced this effect test,48 as have various
commentators. 4 An important attribute of the test is its recogni40 In the Matter of Grand Jury Proceedings,Miller Brewing Co., 687 F2d 1079, 1090

(7th Cir 1982).
" Senate of Puerto Rico, 823 F2d at 582 (citation omitted).
48 Third Circuit: In re Grand Jury Matter (Catania), 682 F2d 61, 63 (3d Cir 1982)
("Rule 6(e) applies... to anything which may reveal what occurred before the grand jury");
New Jersey State Commission of Investigation, 630 F2d at 1001; and Garden Court, 697
F2d at 512.
Seventh Circuit: Stanford, 589 F2d at 291 ("[u]nless information reveals something
about the grand jury proceedings, secrecy is unnecessary"); Baggot, 662 F2d at 1244 ("[o]nly
those subpoenaed documents should be subject to Rule 6(e) which when reasonably considered in the context of the particular grand jury investigation are determined by the trial
court to reveal some secret aspect of the grand jury investigation"); and Miller Brewing Co.,
687 F2d at 1090.
Eighth Circuit: In re Grand Jury Proceedings Relative to Perl, 838 F2d 304, 306 (8th
Cir 1988) ("[ulnless a document reveals something about the intricate workings of the grand
jury itself, the documents are not intrinsically secret just because they were examined by a
grand jury").
Tenth Circuit: Woodard, 757 F2d at 1087 (Rule 6(e) "is intended to protect only against
'disclosures of what is said or what takes place in the grand jury room' "); and Anaya v
United States, 815 F2d 1373, 1379 (10th Cir 1987) ("[w]hen documents or other material

will not reveal what actually has transpired before a grand jury, their disclosure is not an
invasion of the protective secrecy of its proceedings").
District of Columbia Circuit: SEC v Dresser, 628 F2d 1368, 1383 (DC Cir 1982) (documents "do not reveal what has occurred before the grand jury; they reveal only what has
occurred in Dresser's foreign operations"); Fundfor Constitutional Government, 656 F2d at
870 ("[t]he relevant inquiry is ...whether revelation in the particular context would in fact
reveal what was before the grand jury"); In re Sealed Case, 801 F2d 1379 (DC Cir 1986);
and Senate of Puerto Rico, 823 F2d at 582 ("[tlhe touchstone is whether disclosure would
'tend to reveal some secret aspect of the grand jury's investigation' ").
"8See Lytton, 75 J Crim L & Criminol at 1107 (cited in note 12) (citing effect test with
approval). For a detailed explanation of the effect approach, see Note, The Federal Grand
Jury: Practice and Procedure, 13 U Toledo L Rev 1, 7 (1981); and In re Doe, 537 F Supp
1038, 1044-47 (D RI 1982), in which Judge Pettine surveys the existing case law and formulates his own version of the test.
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tion that not all documents will compromise grand jury secrecy if
disclosed. By requiring the trial court to analyze the specific dangers of release, the effect test ensures that neither disclosure nor
suppression is lightly ordered. Furthermore, the careful fact-based
inquiry into the competing secrecy and discovery considerations is
more likely to reach the "correct" normative result than the
mechanical approaches discussed below.
The effect approach suffers from several flaws, however. First,
factual inquiries conducted on a document-by-document basis to
determine the particular effects of disclosure require considerable
judicial time and resources. ° Second, the test is an unstructured,
open-ended inquiry into what the trial court believes may be revealed through disclosure. One court's finding that disclosure will
not compromise the nature, scope, or direction of the grand jury
investigation may differ greatly from another's. 5 1 Nonuniformity of
outcome is especially troublesome because the "substantial discretion" accorded district court determinations under Rule 6(e) limits
appellate review.5 2 Thus, even though the fact-based inquiry promotes "correct" results, the absence of specific guidelines within
the effect test still produces error costs.
Finally, the effect test's individuated decision making process
can also result in high uncertainty costs, since it is difficult to predict how a given trial court will rule on the applicability of Rule
6(e) to particular documents. These uncertainty costs are significant for several reasons. First, a party considering suit against the
subject of a grand jury inquiry will be hampered in assessing the
likelihood of victory, since she will be unsure what documents will
be available to her and upon what showing of need. In addition,
uncertainty impedes the proper functioning of the judicial system.
Lower courts and even other appellate panels faced with document
disclosure questions often receive little guidance from prior appli-

5o

See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 851 F2d at 865; and In re Doe, 537 F Supp at

1046.
" Consider, for example, the differing consequences that two courts attributed to the
discovering party's mere knowledge that the documents it requested had been reviewed by a
grand jury. The panel in In re Sealed Case found the documents within the scope of Rule
6(e), explaining that "[d]isclosure of which documents the grand jury considered reveals, at
the very least, the direction of the grand jury's investigation." 801 F2d at 1381. In contrast,
the court in Fleet National Bank v Export-Import Bank of the U.S. held that the documents at issue were not within the scope of Rule 6(e). The court dismissed the effect that
mere knowledge of grand jury review would have, noting that "[i]t is obvious that any review of documents subpoenaed by a grand jury might alert an intelligent reader to the subject matter of the grand jury's inquiries." 612 F Supp 859, 868 (D DC 1985).
512See Douglas Oil, 441 US at 223.
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cations of the prevailing effect test in their circuits. The ad hoc
qualities of the effect test limit the value of precedent, both for
litigants and the courts.
B. The "Intrinsic Value"/Purpose Test
A second approach to determining whether documents constitute "matters occurring before the grand jury" within the scope of
Rule 6(e) focuses on the purpose of the party seeking disclosure.
The Second Circuit advanced the classic formulation of this test in
1960:
[W]hen ... data is sought for its own sake-for its intrinsic
value in the furtherance of a lawful investigation-rather than
to learn what took place before the grand jury, it is not a valid
defense to disclosure that the same ... documents had been,
or were presently being, examined by a grand jury."
Although this language from United States v Interstate Dress
Carriershas endured for thirty years,5 4 courts and commentators
have criticized the purpose test as insufficiently protective of grand
jury secrecy. The existence of a legitimate purpose for disclosure
may not prevent a party from incidentally learning a great deal
about matters occurring before the grand jury.55 In addition, some
courts' definitions of a "legitimate" purpose for obtaining disclosure are so broad as to encompass virtually all civil litigation.5 6
When interpreted this broadly, the test approximates a blanket
rule that documents are not subject to Rule 6(e).
One illustration of the perverse results the purpose test yields
can be found in United States v Saks.57 In this case, the Federal
Trade Commission requested access to all documents obtained by
'3 Interstate Dress Carriers,280 F2d at 54. See also, United States v Saks & Co., 426 F
Supp 812, 814 (S D NY 1976); SEC v Everest, 87 FRD 100, 105 (S D NY 1980); In re
United States v 6918 North Tyron St., Charlotte,NC, 672 F Supp 890, 896 (W D NC 1987);
and Capitol Indemnity Corp. v First Minnesota Construction Co., 405 F Supp 929, 931 (D
Mass 1975).
5' See generally Lytton, 75 J Crim L & Criminol at 1106 (cited in note 12) (finding that
the "prevailing view among the courts" is that there are no secrecy concerns when documents are sought for their intrinsic value).
" See In re Doe, 537 F Supp at 1046; Comment, 47 U Chi L Rev at 612 (cited in note
13); and Advisory Committee Note to Rule 6(e)(3)(C), Preliminary Draft at 8-9 (cited in
note 17).
11 See Everest, 87 FRD at 105 (citing "use in a civil proceeding" as a legitimate purpose
for seeking documentary disclosure).
"1426 F Supp 812 (S D NY 1976). See generally Advisory Committee Note to Rule
6(e)(3)(C), PreliminaryDraft at 9 (cited in note 17).
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the grand jury investigating antitrust violations in the women's
clothing industry.5 8 Unlike the discovering parties in other cases
who requested specific documents,5 9 the FTC made no attempt to
particularize its request or define the documents in any terms beyond grand jury possession. The court granted the FTC's broad
request, reasoning that the documents were sought for their intrinsic value and not "merely to learn what took place before the
grand jury." 60
There are two problems with this result. First, the FTC (or a
civil litigant in a similar position) might not be able to obtain all
the requested documents under normal civil discovery standards.
Not only do the discovery rules require some particularity of identification, but they also limit discovery to materials in the possession of the opposing party. In Saks, the documents the FTC obtained came from a variety of sources."1 Any time parties obtain
more documents as a result of a Rule 6(e) classification than they
could otherwise have obtained under normal civil discovery standards, the policy of preventing appropriation of grand jury investigative powers is implicated.
Second, as others have pointed out, the mere fact that a party
seeks documents for their intrinsic value does not dispel the harm
that might arise from the party's learning, with delight, what transpired before the grand jury.62 Thus, the purpose test's focus on
"motive" to the exclusion of "effect" fails to adequately accommodate important secrecy concerns.
Like the effect test, the purpose test requires costly case-bycase judicial inquiry. But unlike the effect test, which often reaches
the "correct" result, the purpose test focuses on an issue-the
party's motive in seeking disclosure-ultimately unrelated to the
question of whether grand jury secrecy is violated through release
of the document. The uncertainty costs of the purpose test are also
high, since litigants are unsure what documents will ultimately be
available to them, and lower courts receive little guidance from
prior applications of the fact-based inquiry. 3

*8Saks, 426 F Supp at 813-14.
59See Interstate Dress Carriers, 280 F2d at 53 (Interstate Commerce Commission
sought "certain of [subject's] records" in connection with a routine administrative investigation). See also Capitol Indemnity Corp., 405 F Supp at 930 (surety company sought documents in possession of defendant "relating to the construction of the apartment complex").
60Saks, 426 F Supp at 814-15.
61Id.
62 Comment, 47 U Chi L Rev at 612 (cited in note 13).
"' In addition to the standard purpose inquiry, several courts have adopted what ap-
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C. The "Per Se Subject to Rule 6(e)" Approach
A third approach adopted by some courts treats documents as
always subject to the secrecy provisions of Rule 6(e), so that disclosure is available only through the Rule 6(e)(3) exceptions. Appellate courts employing this approach assume that documents,
like testimony, are encompassed within the phrase "matters occurring before the grand jury," but provide little discussion or analysis
of the issue. 4 Several district courts have made the same implicit
assumption. 5 A number of other district courts, however, have
made an explicit decision to accord documents and testimony
equal treatment under Rule 6(e), largely to promote grand jury secrecy policies. 66
Although this approach provides a bright line rule and requires minimal judicial involvement in determining whether docupears to be a hybrid purpose/effect test. Although the Seventh Circuit cases discussed at
notes 46-52 espouse the effect test, two other cases cast some doubt on the circuit's position.
See Almond Pharmacy, 753 F2d at 578 ("[i]f a document is sought for its own sake rather
than to learn what took place before the grand jury, and if its release will not seriously
compromise the secrecy of the grand jury's deliberations, Rule 6(e) does not forbid its release"); and Lucas v Turner, 725 F2d 1095, 1101-02 (7th Cir 1984) (citing Interstate Dress
Carriers,280 F2d 52, with approval). See also Cumis InsuranceSociety, Inc. v South-Coast
Bank, 610 F Supp 193, 198 (N D Ind 1985) (citing both effect test and Interstate Dress
Carriers'purpose test with approval). Other cases adopting this hybrid approach include In
re Grand Jury Proceedings, 505 F Supp 978, 981-82 (D Me 1981); and Davis v Romney, 55
FRD 337, 341 (E D Pa 1972). Note that in practice the purpose prong essentially drops out
of the hybrid test, since there are few, if any, instances where the purpose test would prohibit disclosure when the effect test does not.
64 See, for example, Petrol Stops Northwest v Continental Oil Co., 647 F2d 1005 (9th
Cir 1981); Texas v United States Steel, 546 F2d 626 (5th Cir 1977); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 309 F2d 440 (3d Cir 1962); United States v RMI Co., 599 F2d 1183 (3d Cir
1979); and In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Kluger), 827 F2d 868 (2d Cir 1987). See also
Garden Court, 697 F2d at 512 (dicta) ("[w]ere we writing on a clean slate, we might well
hold that disclosure of any material generated in connection with a grand jury proceeding is
governed by Rule 6(e)(2)").
" See United States v Climatemp, Inc., 482 F Supp 376, 388 (N D Ill 1979) ("[iut is
undisputed that the secrecy of the grand jury applies to documents as well as testimony");
and Petition of the United States for the Disclosure of Grand Jury Matters (MillerBrewing Co.), 518 F Supp 163, 168 (E D Wis 1981).
66 See In the Matter of Grand Jury, 469 F Supp 666, 671 (M D Pa 1978) (explaining
that the grand jury might suffer as a public institution through the disclosure of documents); In re Grand Jury Investigation of Cuisinarts,Inc., 516 F Supp 1008, 1022 n 17 (D
Conn 1981) ("having reviewed the case law concerning grand jury secrecy, the court has
found no convincing reason to apply different standards, or to accord different treatment, to
subpoenaed documents"); and In re Grand Jury Disclosure, 550 F Supp 1171, 1175-77 (E D
Va 1982) ("[tlhe language of Rule 6(e), the traditional policy of grand jury secrecy, and the
case law require that documents subpoenaed by a federal grand jury be protected from disclosure except as provided by Rule 6(e)"). See also Index Fund, Inc. v Hagopian, 512 F
Supp 1122, 1128 (S D NY 1981); and In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Daewoo), 613 F Supp
672, 680 (D Or 1985).
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ments may be disclosed, it unduly frustrates discovery. When documents are always subject to Rule 6(e), a civil litigant that
requests a specific document coincidentally reviewed by a grand
jury will not be able to obtain it (absent a showing of particularized need under Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i)), even though the document's
release would reveal little about the nature and scope of the grand
jury investigation not already known to the litigant from the defendant's inability to produce it.1 In addition, potential for abuse
of such a regime exists, since companies under grand jury investigation could make anticipated civil discovery more difficult simply
by disclosing incriminating documents to the grand jury."'
D.

The "Per Se Never Subject to Rule 6(e)" Approach

An opposite "per se" approach has been suggested by several
courts.6 9 They read "matters occurring before the grand jury" as
including testimony and transcripts, but excluding documents and
other exhibits before the grand jury. Just as the prior approach
unduly restricts discovery, this approach pays "insufficient attention to the important privacy and confidentiality purposes embodied in rule 6(e) and to the need for judicial supervision of the release of material obtained by coercion with the promise of
17
secrecy. 1
Consider, for example, the request in United States v Saks 71
for all documents obtained by the grand jury. Wholesale release of
those documents to the plaintiff would not only inform him of the
67 See In re Doe, 537 F Supp at 1045; and Advisory Committee
Note to Rule 6(e)(3)(C),
PreliminaryDraft at 9-10 (cited in note 17). But see In re Grand Jury Disclosure, 550 F
Supp at 1175 ("[d]isclosure of any document subpoenaed and reviewed by the grand jury
constitutes at least indirect disclosure of 'matters occurring before the grand jury' ") (emphasis added).
68 See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 851 F2d at 865; Advisory Committee Note to
Rule 6(e)(3)(C), PreliminaryDraft at 9-10 (cited in note 17); and Comment, 47 U Chi L Rev
at 613 (cited in note 13). Note, however, that this concern is likely limited to documents
that do not particularly expose the defendant to criminal liability, but that might admit a
high degree of civil exposure. If the document were highly suggestive of criminal liability,
the defendant would not voluntarily turn it over, no matter how damaging from a civil
perspective.
"9 See Weinstein, 511 F2d at 627 n 5 ("[iun any event it is questionable whether Rule
6(e) applies to documents"); and In re Grand Jury Investigation of Ven-Fuel, 441 F Supp
1299, 1303 (M D Fla 1977) ("it is doubtful whether mere documentary information was ever
included within the scope of Rule 6(e)"). See also Golden Quality Ice Cream Co. v Deerfield
Specialty Papers,Inc., 87 FRD 53, 59 (E D Pa 1980); and Illinois v Sarbaugh,552 F2d 768,
772 n 2 (7th Cir 1977).
70 In
re Grand Jury Proceedings,851 F2d at 864-65. See also In re Doe, 537 F Supp at
1044-45.
1 426 F Supp 812. See text at notes 57-63 for discussion of this case.

1990]

Grand Jury Documents

direction and scope of the grand jury investigation, but would give
him an advantage over normal civil discovery practices. Consider
also materials prepared by an outsider (for example, an accountant) for grand jury use. Such documents, if disclosed, would reveal
the grand jury's investigative focus and lines of questioning.
Materials prepared specifically for grand jury use in fact approximate transcripts of testimony in their level of disclosure. Thus, an
approach to the classification of documents under Rule 6(e) that
always ignores the dangers of disclosure is inconsistent with the
critical secrecy policies underlying the rule.
The costs to the judicial process of the two per se approaches
are slight; they consume minimal resources and produce low uncertainty costs, since there is virtually no room for judgment or discretion. These approaches do, however, result in high error costs.
Under an "always subject to Rule 6(e)" approach, many documents
that would not compromise grand jury secrecy are nevertheless
subject to the restrictive Rule 6(e) framework, thereby limiting
civil discovery opportunities without an offsetting benefit to the
cause of grand jury secrecy. The same can be said for the "never
subject to Rule 6(e)" approach, where documents that may truly
reveal the inner workings of the grand jury are disclosed without
invoking the protective machinery of the Rule 6(e)(3) exceptions.
E. The Grand Jury Secrecy "Policies" Test
Although later vacated on other grounds, a recent Ninth Circuit case suggested a fifth possible test for determining whether
documents or other items are "matters occurring before the grand
jury. 7' 2 In United States v Benjamin, the court stated that "[i]f
any of the policies underlying grand jury secrecy may be adversely
affected by a disclosure, Rule 6(e) should apply. 1' 3 Although the
court's attention to the policies behind grand jury secrecy is commendable, the test as applied will almost always result in subjecting documents to the Rule 6(e) framework.
In Benjamin, the court found the documents (tape recordings)
to be "matters occurring before the grand jury" because disclosure
implicated the policies of (1) protecting an accused from unwarranted reputational damage, and (2) protecting the grand jury
from outside interference. Since the individual to whom the docu-

72

See United States v Benjamin, 852 F2d 413 (9th Cir 1988), vacated on other

grounds, 109 S Ct 1948 (1989).
" Id at 418. See text at note 34 for list of policies underlying grand jury secrecy.
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ments were disclosed was involved in civil litigation against the defendants, the court found that he had an interest in damaging
their reputations and influencing the grand jury. 4 Thus, the court
concluded that disclosure of the tape recordings could only be
made upon a showing of particularized need under Rule
6(e)(3)(C)(i).
Unlike Benjamin, most efforts to obtain documents do not involve actual interference with grand jury proceedings. But in proposing its test, the court explicitly recognized the institutional concern behind grand jury secrecy-"protect[ing] witnesses'

willingness to come forward and testify fully and frankly. 7' 5 Any

disclosure of a document arguably implicates this policy: future
witnesses will refuse to cooperate with the grand jury if they fear
eventual release of the materials. With the "policies underlying
grand jury secrecy" thus implicated in almost every document disclosure case, the Benjamin test may bring too many documents
within the Rule 6(e) framework. Like the per se rule that all documents fall within the scope of Rule 6(e), this test gives insufficient
consideration to liberal discovery policies.
Although the uncertainty costs of such an approach are
low-one can usually predict that the test will classify a document
74 Benjamin, 852 F2d at 418. The facts of the case are complicated, but important in
understanding the Ninth Circuit's test. A federal grand jury was investigating Benjamin and
various co-defendants, members of the Synanon organization. Dr. Richard Ofshe, a sociologist studying Synanon, testified before the grand jury as a witness. The government subsequently enlisted Ofshe's aid in its investigation of Synanon, and obtained an order from the
trial court disclosing tape recordings of the defendants to him. Id at 416-17. These tape
recordings were the "documents" at issue in the case.
The Ninth Circuit decided that the secrecy policies of preventing outside interference
with the grand jury and protecting the accused from reputational damage were implicated
because, at the time of the disclosure, Ofshe was involved in a multi-million dollar civil suit
against Synanon and some of the defendants. Id at 416-18. At least one of Ofshe's claims in
the civil suit (destruction of evidence) also underlay the criminal charges. Id at 417. Although the court did not elaborate on its reasoning, it must have envisioned a scenario in
which Ofshe would manipulate the evidence he reviewed in his investigative capacity in
order to ensure the defendants' indictment (and, later, conviction) on the criminal charges.
The defendants' conviction would presumably have buttressed Ofshe's own civil claims.
The connection between the documents (the tape recordings) and the grand jury policies seems somewhat tenuous, however. As a member of the federal investigative team, Dr.
Ofshe could "influence" the grand jury (and damage the defendants' reputations) in the
manner described above without ever reviewing the tape recordings; he could commit perjury while testifying as an expert witness, or develop false evidence that the government
would present to the grand jury. Criminal sanctions exist for such actions, however. The real
concern should have been that Ofshe might use the tape recordings-which he may have
been unable to obtain under normal civil discovery standards-to his personal advantage in
the civil suit.
11 Id at 417.
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as a "matter[] occurring before the grand jury"-there are no corresponding savings in judicial resources. Under the Benjamin test,
a court must still examine disclosure in light of "grand jury policies," a highly fact-based inquiry.
F. The Rebuttable Presumption that Documents are "Matters
Occurring Before the Grand Jury"
The Sixth Circuit recently advanced- another approach to the
treatment of documents under Rule 6(e).78 Documents are presumed to be "matters occurring before the grand jury," but the
party seeking disclosure may rebut that presumption by showing:
(1) that the information is public; (2) that the grand jury did not
obtain it through coercive means; or (3) that "disclosure would be
otherwise available by civil discovery and would not reveal the nature, scope, or direction of the grand jury inquiry."7 The court
claimed that this method combines the better aspects of the "effect" and "per se subject to Rule 6(e)" tests, "providing more cer78
tainty while avoiding too-technical rigidity.
Although the rebuttable presumption approach offers advantages over other existing approaches, the particular factors selected
by the Sixth Circuit fail to identify the key elements distinguishing
a genuine breach of secrecy from a minimal disclosure. The next
section discusses the flaws in the Sixth Circuit's approach, and
proposes an alternative set of rebuttal factors.

III. A
A.

PROPOSED APPROACH TO THE CLASSIFICATION OF
DOCUMENTS UNDER RULE 6(e)

Analysis
1.

Problems with the Sixth Circuit approach.

A presumptive approach offers a compromise between the two
types of tests discussed in the prior section: (1) per se rules, which
minimize administrative and uncertainty costs but increase error
costs through over- and under-inclusiveness; and (2) case-by-case
approaches, which require significant judicial resources but more
closely approximate desired outcomes. If designed properly, a rebuttable presumption can minimize the error costs plaguing the
per se rules, while simultaneously reducing the administrative and
uncertainty burdens of the case-by-case methods.
" In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 851 F2d 860 (6th Cir 1988).
7 Id at 866-67.
78 Id at 867.
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In the same way that the effect test reduces the error costs
associated with blanket rules by requiring judicial inquiry into the
facts of the case, a rebuttable presumption reduces those costs by
permitting the party seeking disclosure to make the necessary
showing. The residual error costs remaining with the effect test
due to a lack of specific guidelines are largely eliminated by a presumption rebuttable upon proof of any of several clear circumstances requiring disclosure. Uncertainty costs are reduced since
parties contemplating suit will know in advance the showing they
must make to obtain disclosure. These parties can weigh the likelihood of success against the importance of the documents to their
case. Administrative costs are reduced by focusing the court's inquiry on the circumstances that rebut the general presumption and
the sufficiency of the moving party's proof.
For these reasons, the Sixth Circuit was correct in advocating
a presumptive approach to the treatment of documents under Rule
6(e). The court -was also correct in structuring the test to favor
grand jury secrecy over liberal discovery.7 9 It could just as easily
have reversed the presumption (i.e., "documents are presumed
outside Rule 6(e) unless the party resisting disclosure rebuts the
presumption"), but its policy choice correctly weighed the competing concerns.
The rebuttal factors the court proposed,80 however, fail to distinguish between dritical and unimportant disclosures. No cases
have yet applied the Sixth Circuit's test, which thus must be evaluated on the basis of a single sentence in the court's opinion. 1 But
the rebuttal factors seem to suffer from several problems. One general concern is the loose structure of the test. If the party seeking
disclosure can make a sufficient showing of any of the three factors, the presumption that the documents are covered by Rule 6(e)
is rebutted. Such a structure is appropriate only if each factor independently captures key discovery and disclosure concerns.
The first factor requires the moving party to show that the
information sought is public. Most items we think of as public,
however, like periodic financial statements required by federal and
state law, are mass-produced and available to a civil plaintiff without resort to discovery. The court probably included this exception
as a concession to the practical difficulties of obtaining some allegedly "public" documents from sources other than the owner.
See discussion in text at notes 29-44.
11 See text at note 77 for list of rebuttal factors.
81 In re Grand Jury Proceedings,851 F2d at 867.
71

1990]

Grand Jury Documents

The second showing, that the information was not obtained by
coercive means, distinguishes between documents that are subpoenaed by the grand jury and those that are voluntarily presented.
As discussed in section IA, however, all documents reviewed by a
grand jury-whether subpoenaed or voluntarily presented-should
be treated equally for the purpose of classification as "matters occurring before the grand jury." The Sixth Circuit's decision to permit disclosure of only documents voluntarily produced to the
grand jury will certainly eliminate whatever voluntary production
actually occurs. Furthermore, the absence of coercion does not reduce the likelihood that excessive disclosure will permit civil litigants to appropriate the grand jury's broad investigative powers
for their own gain.
The court's third rebuttal factor requires the moving party to
show that disclosure would otherwise be available by civil discovery and would not reveal the nature, scope, or direction of the
grand jury inquiry. The first part of this showing simply imports
the relevancy, non-privilege, and particularity requirements of
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26 and 34.82 The second half of

the showing seems to undermine the advantages of a rebuttable
presumption. By requiring a party to show that disclosure will not
reveal the nature, scope, or direction of the grand jury inquiry, the
court introduces a fact-intensive "effect" analysis. If a party cannot rebut the presumption via the first or second factors (i.e., the
item is not public and was subpoenaed), the court must conduct an
effect test review. This eliminates the advantages of a rebuttable
presumption by introducing administrative, uncertainty, and error
costs.
2. The proposed test.
One need not abandon the presumptive approach just because
the Sixth Circuit's rebuttal factors are troublesome. Several cases
using an effect approach have suggested circumstances in which
disclosure can be permitted without infringing secrecy concerns.
By converting these into rebuttal elements, one can create a test
superior to both the Sixth Circuit's presumptive approach and the
effect test. Thus, this Comment proposes that documents be subject to the Rule 6(e) secrecy framework unless the party seeking
disclosure can show: (1) that the request lists specific documents
82 See note 9.
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and is framed without reference to the grand jury; 3 and (2) that
the documents sought were created for an independent purpose
4
unrelated to the grand jury investigation.
To return to the example with which this Comment began, the
first rebuttal factor contemplates a situation where Company P requests, first from Company D but then from the U.S. Attorney or
the court, "invoices of semiconductor purchases between January
1986 and November 1987." Since Company P will already be aware
of the identity of the documents and the fact that they are being
reviewed by the grand jury, "release... will not disclose any additional information as to why the grand jury subpoenaed the documents or what conclusions were reached in reviewing them.""5 Imagine, in contrast, that Company P seeks all documents reviewed
by the grand jury in connection with the Company D investigation.
Such a release would not only reveal the scope and nature of the
investigation, but might also disclose documents that Company P
would have been unable to obtain under normal civil discovery
standards.
The second rebuttal factor ensures that the moving party does
not profit from the existence of the grand jury by obtaining documents prepared specifically for the investigation. For example,
Company D might have retained a financial expert to prepare reports and analyses for the grand jury concerning the propriety of
various invoices and book entries. Alternatively, the grand jury itself may have commissioned the help of outside experts. Company
P would benefit from the grand jury investigation if it could obtain
these reports by specific request. Liberal discovery should extend
no further than the underlying documents from which the expert's
analysis was drawn.
B.

Application

For purposes of illustration, it may be useful to explore how
this proposed test would have resolved the question of documentary classification in several actual cases. In some cases, the results
would have been the same, but the requisite analysis would have
86 for example,
been quicker and cleaner. In Almond Pharmacy,
the
11 See Dresser,628 F2d at 1383; Senate of Puerto Rico, 823 F2d at 583; Tigar & Buffone v United States Departmentof Justice, 590 F Supp 1012, 1016 (D DC 1984); and In re
Doe, 537 F Supp at 1046-47.
" See Dresser, 628 F2d at 1383; and Senate of Puerto Rico, 823 F2d at 583.
81In re Doe, 537 F Supp at 1047.
I' 753 F2d 575.
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Illinois Department of Public Aid sought to obtain business
records from several pharmacies. The Department needed these
records to comply with auditing requirements under the Medicaid
program, but a federal grand jury had previously subpoenaed the
records. The Court of Appeals permitted disclosure, concluding on
the basis of a hybrid "effect/purpose" inquiry that the records
were not "matters occurring before the grand jury."8
Under the proposed approach, the documents would be presumed "matters occurring before the grand jury," but the Department of Public Aid would be able to rebut the presumption. First,
the Department sought specific business documents from the pharmacies as part of its routine auditing procedures, not "all documents before the grand jury." This kind of limited disclosure
would not reveal the inner workings of the grand jury. The Department already knew of the existence of the documents and would
have been able to obtain them from the pharmacies pursuant to its
audit powers had the grand jury investigation never occurred. Second, the business records in question were clearly prepared for a
purpose independent of the grand jury investigation-namely, the
normal operation of a business. Thus, the Department could easily
have made the showing required to rebut the presumption and
classify the documents as outside the scope of Rule 6(e).
On the facts of Garden Court,88 the proposed approach would
again yield the result actually reached, this time protecting the
documents from disclosure save possibly under one of the Rule
6(e)(3) exceptions. In Garden Court, a nursing home and its operator had been the subject of a federal grand jury investigation into
mail fraud and Medicaid abuse, resulting in indictments and eventual guilty pleas. In connection with a state income tax liability
investigation, the Pennsylvania Department of Revenue sought
disclosure of "'all of the grand jury materials pertinent to its investigation.'-89 Among the key items at issue were "auditors' anal-

yses of Garden Court's books and records, prepared to assist the
grand jury." 90 Using the effect test, the Court of Appeals concluded
that the auditors' analyses were "matters occurring before the
grand jury," and hence subject to Rule 6(e)."
Id at 579.
88697 F2d 511.
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81Id at 512.
90 Id.
91Id at 513.
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Under the proposed approach, the Department of Revenue
would be required to rebut the presumption that the analyses are
"matters occurring before the grand jury" in order to avoid the
restrictive Rule 6(e) framework. Such a showing would have been
difficult for the Department to make. First, the Department did
not seek specific items from the nursing home that happened, coincidentally, to be under subpoena from the grand jury; rather, it
sought a blanket disclosure of all the grand jury materials pertinent to its investigation. Such an attempt to convert the grand
jury's coercive powers to civil advantage would clearly reveal not
only details of the grand jury's investigation but its nature, scope,
and direction, as well. Thus, the phrasing of the Department's request alone would have prevented it from rebutting the presumption that the materials are subject to Rule 6(e).
Second, the auditors' analyses of Garden Court's books and
records subpoenaed by the grand jury were clearly not created for
an independent purpose; instead, they were specifically prepared
to assist the grand jury in its investigation. As such, they would
reveal the grand jury's questions and the auditors' conclusions
about Garden Court's operation. The Department would thus have
been unable to show that the documents were prepared independent of the grand jury investigation. In order to obtain the documents, the Department would have had to satisfy one of the Rule
6(e)(3) exceptions allowing disclosure of matters occurring before
the grand jury.
One last example illustrates how the proposed approach to
classifying documents under Rule 6(e) may produce results different from those reached under other approaches. In Baggot,92 the
Internal Revenue Service sought disclosure of materials that had
previously been subpoenaed by a federal grand jury for use in a
civil tax investigation. 3 Using the effect test, but without much
discussion of the nature of these items, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's finding that the business records were
"'matters occurring before the grand jury' and therefore .subject to
Rule 6(e)." 4

92

662 F2d 1232.

" Among the specific items sought by the IRS were: "all purchase and sale statements
for accounts 21, 22, 4100, and 4101 in the name of James Baggot at Pacific Trading Company for the year 1975; all purchase and sale statements at Central Soya, Inc. for account
509 .... account 608... and account 605 ... for the year 1975 ... ." Id at 1234-35.
91 Id at 1238.
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Under the proposed approach, however, the IRS could have
obtained disclosure fairly easily. First, the IRS made a request for
specific trading statements, framed without reference to the grand
jury's investigation. Second, the purchase and sale statements had
clearly been prepared independent of and prior to the grand jury
investigation; they were ordinary accounts of trading activity that
contained no grand jury-tailored analysis, unlike the reports in
Garden Court. These documents, contrary to the Court of Appeals'
holding, should not have been considered "matters occurring
before the grand jury." They implicated none of the key concerns
about disclosure of proprietary grand jury information embodied
in the rebuttable presumption approach.
CONCLUSION

This Comment proposes a presumptive approach to the treatment of documents under FRCrP 6(e). Documents are presumed
to be "matters occurring before the grand jury" and discoverable
only via the Rule 6(e)(3) exceptions to the general rule of grand
jury secrecy, unless the party seeking disclosure can show: (1) that
the request lists specific documents and is framed without reference to the grand jury, and (2) that the documents sought were
created for an independent purpose unrelated to the grand jury
investigation. If the moving party adequately rebuts the presumption, then the documents fall outside the scope of Rule 6(e) and
are discoverable under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure like
other relevant, non-privileged material.
The text and legislative history of Rule 6(e) provide little
guidance in classifying documents as "matters occurring before the
grand jury," and judicial interpretation has produced a myriad of
unsatisfactory tests. Some of these tests fail to balance the important competing considerations of grand jury secrecy and liberal
discovery. Others devote significant judicial resources to fact-intensive inquiries without providing adequate guidance to future courts
and litigants. The proposed presumptive test minimizes the
normative errors produced by the former category of tests, while
simultaneously reducing the administrative and uncertainty burdens of the latter group. In addition, the suggested rebuttal factors
better differentiate between critical breaches of secrecy and minimal disclosures than the rebuttal factors advanced by the one
court that has heretofore advocated a presumptive approach.

